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Roles for Individual Neurons
Jonathan C. W. Edwards*
University College London, London, UK
It is widely perceived that there is a problem in giving a naturalistic account of
mental representation that deals adequately with the issue of meaning, interpretation,
or significance (semantic content). It is suggested here that this problem may arise
partly from the conflation of two vernacular senses of representation: representation-
as-origin and representation-as-input. The flash of a neon sign may in one sense
represent a popular drink, but to function as a representation it must provide an input
to a ‘consumer’ in the street. The arguments presented draw on two principles –
the neuron doctrine and the need for a venue for ‘presentation’ or ‘reception’ of a
representation at a specified site, consistent with the locality principle. It is also argued
that domains of representation cannot be defined by signal traffic, since they can be
expected to include ‘null’ elements based on non-firing cells. In this analysis, mental
representations-as-origin are distributed patterns of cell firing. Each firing cell is given
semantic value in its own right – some form of atomic propositional significance – since
different axonal branches may contribute to integration with different populations of
signals at different downstream sites. Representations-as-input are patterns of local
co-arrival of signals in the form of synaptic potentials in dendrites. Meaning then draws
on the relationships between active and null inputs, forming ‘scenarios’ comprising a
molecular combination of ‘premises’ from which a new output with atomic propositional
significance is generated. In both types of representation, meaning, interpretation or
significance pivots on events in an individual cell. (This analysis only applies to ‘occurrent’
representations based on current neural activity.) The concept of representations-as-
input emphasizes the need for an internal ‘consumer’ of a representation and the
dependence of meaning on the co-relationships involved in an input interaction between
signals and consumer. The acceptance of this necessity provides a basis for resolving
the problem that representations appear both as distributed (representation-as-origin)
and as local (representation-as-input). The key implications are that representations in
the brain are massively multiple both in series and in parallel, and that individual cells play
specific semantic roles. These roles are discussed in relation to traditional concepts of
‘gnostic’ cell types.
Keywords: mental representation, percept, grandmother cell, pontifical cell, gnostic cell
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INTRODUCTION
Concepts of mental representation are widely invoked in
neurobiology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, and philosophy.
Yet, as Seager and Bourget (2007) note: “there is no acknowledged
theory of mental representation.” This appears to be partly
because people differ in terms of the explanatory work they want
such a theory to do (Stich, 1992). It also reflects an impasse in
reaching a consensus on how mental representations could fit
into a naturalistic account of the brain; what sort of substrate,
or causal nexus could support a mental representation, and how?
I shall argue that these are interdependent questions and that a
careful assessment of the logical constraints on substrate, in terms
of physical dynamics and their location, may clarify the ways in
which mental representation may be a useful concept, as well as
vice versa.
From the outset I wish to emphasize that the problem
I address relates only to what may be called ‘occurrent’ or
‘active’ representations in which signals are sent and received
on specific occasions. There is another use of the term that
might be called a ‘dispositional representation’ – an acquired
pattern of cellular connectivity underlying memory, knowledge,
or concept acquisition, that disposes the brain to generate
occurrent representations in response to stimuli (Simmons
and Barsalou, 2003). I will be using ‘representation’ to mean
‘occurrent representation.’
The naturalization problem is not so much about whether a
representation is to the right, left, front or back of the brain, or
what connection tracts are involved. The more basic problem
is defining the type, or level, of biophysical location that could
support a fitting causal role, and with appropriate information
capacity (‘bandwidth’). There are those who would argue that
we have a rough answer: that representations can be equated
with patterns of neural activity, or firing. However, as discussed
below, this fails to address key problems, justifiably of concern to
philosophers of mind. Meaning is not to be solved so easily.
It might be argued that searching for a detailed substrate type
for mental representation is overly reductionist or, in theoretical
modeling terms, simply premature. It might even be considered
immaterial to understanding of how a representation can have
a meaning, either in terms of external referents or internal
‘meaning to the subject.’ However, I think the search is justified
on the following grounds. Firstly, spatial pattern is about the only
way meaning can be encoded in a brain at any point in time, as
far as we know, so at least type of spatial pattern and location is
likely to be central to a theory of meaning. Secondly, recognizing
that reductive analysis of mechanism is only part of the story does
not mean that fruitful progress in neural mechanisms should be
abandoned half-finished and replaced by hand-waving. Rather
than, as Marr (1982) advocated, treating the biophysical and
‘functional’ levels of analysis as incommensurable, to be able to
test viability of theories I believe, with Trehub (1991), that we
need some idea of how and where they could correspond.
Moreover, the ability to suggest at least one plausible physical
example for any theoretical model is a requirement that is
arguably never premature. A search for such examples can render
explicit contradictions in popular concepts. The key proposal
here is that neuropsychology may benefit from a greater focus
on the input aspect of mental representation. The author’s
background is in immunology. It was not until we insisted on a
grounding in a dynamics of integration of signals into individual
cells that we began to understand leucocyte behavior in immune
recognition and memory (Male et al., 2012). Hypotheses that
could not be so grounded were discarded. The gap between work
on post-synaptic integration (e.g., Branco and Häusser, 2011;
Smith et al., 2013; Ishikawa et al., 2015) and psychology may still
be harder to bridge but the possibility of grounding in plausible
input mechanisms should be an acid test of all models of mental
representation.
THE NATURE OF MENTAL
REPRESENTATIONS
Representation is a term used in a variety of ways that are not
always transparent. It is not simply ‘re-presentation,’ and not just
because ‘presentation’ might be a better label. It can also imply
‘proxy’ or ‘symbol.’ In the mental case, where representations do
not resemble their referents in any simple way, the meaning of
the term will be preconditioned not only by presumptions about
how brains work but also metaphysical standpoint. A materialist
may think in terms of brain states representing external ‘things’
whereas someone taking a dynamist or structural realist approach
(as I do) may think in terms of internal dynamic relations
representing external dynamic relations (Ladyman and Ross,
2007). There will also be different views on how these concepts
relate to subjectivity or phenomenality. To clarify the way
‘representation’ relates to meaning it may help to consider two
main purposes to which the term ‘mental representation’ is put.
Mental representation may be invoked simply as part of
an account of the human brain as a machine that generates
outputs from inputs. A mental representation can be seen as the
equivalent of local currents or magnetizations in a computer.
As long as we accept that brain cells send messages around
in a way vaguely similar to computer components, we can
consider the nature of mental representations in this context
as just a technical issue, like the difference between Microsoft
Windows and Mac OS-X, without raising too many philosophical
questions. ‘Representation’ is being used here purely to imply
some internal dynamics that co-vary usefully with external world
dynamics.
There is, nevertheless, even here, a need to define a
representation more precisely than just that total pattern of brain
activity that arises in a specific context, whether the presence
of a red square or blue circle, or when thinking ‘I suspect the
recession will double-dip.’ A representation is not just a pattern
of events; it is a pattern with a causal role. A red square will
trigger patterns in the retinae, geniculate bodies, primary and
secondary visual cortices, temporal, parietal and frontal lobes,
all with different causal roles. To function, the content of any
individual representation must be available to some functional
component at a causal nexus: what Millikan calls a ‘consumer’
(Ryder et al., 2012). Thus we may need to talk of many mental
representations at many levels rather than a single representation.
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That then begs the question of which mental representations
are those envisaged by philosophers and linguists such as Fodor
(1985) or Dretske (1986) and what their consumers are.
The second motivation for talking about mental
representations is in the context of questions about first
person experience, as conceived from positions on the nature
of ‘mentality’ ranging from Cartesian to eliminitivist (Stich,
1992). Thus ‘mental representation’ is often used to imply an
associated experience, in which operational meaning is somehow
‘interpreted.’ This may be as a ‘percept,’ as when something
is viewed or heard, or a ‘mental image,’ as when retrieving
memories, thinking of a scene or sound, or in dreams (Fodor,
1975; Kosslyn, 1994).
There is a general assumption that there is only one instance of
this ‘percept’ type of representation in a brain at a time, and there
has been extended debate over whether this is local or distributed
(e.g., Barlow, 1972; Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988; Marcus, 2001),
which remains unresolved. It is suggested here that this may
reflect confusion about what we should expect the biophysical
processes underlying a representation, of the ‘percept’ type, to
consist of and where they might be – and that the assumption
that there is only one such representation needs challenging.
There are those who, probably rightly, point out that a
first person account of mental representation will ultimately
be redundant to a description of its physical dynamics (e.g.,
Churchland, 1992). The mistake, I believe, is to take this as a
reason for discounting the first person account. Even granted
that representations of the percept type may form a tiny minority
of the total, and quite apart from the desire to know how there
comes to be a first person account, it is likely that without
heuristic clues from experience and the language we use to
describe it the causal dynamics of all our representations will
remain intractable. However tidy it may feel to regard talk of
‘phenomenality’ as outside physical science, I follow those who
argue that there is a strong case for accepting that ‘phenomenal
experience’ plays a crucial role in all science, as the medium of
observation, and that we should be happy to make all use of it
we can. Thus, mental representations associated with experience
or ‘feel,’ whether percepts or ‘current belief states’ (Crane, 2014)
are not only those of greatest philosophical interest but may
also be particularly worth exploring for their potential to shed
light on mental processes in general. I shall therefore focus on
such representations from now on, taking sensory percepts as the
paradigm.
GENERAL CAUSAL PRINCIPLES
Unless there are good reasons otherwise, an account of a
representation-as-percept in a brain should follow causal
principles used elsewhere in physical science, where possible
confirmed by experimental neurophysiology. Two such
principles are particularly relevant. The first is the neuron
doctrine. The second is that the content of a percept will be
encoded in signals that form inputs to some physical domain.
The neuron doctrine, in essence, is the principle that brain
function (qua ‘thinking’) can be explained by the interactions of
separate neuronal units (Gold and Stoljar, 1999). Each neuron
is a discrete computational (in the broad sense of having rule-
based input–output relations) unit, conforming to biophysical
laws. The timing of firing of a neuron is determined by chemical
and electrical interactions between the cell and its immediate
environment. All cause and effect relations occur locally. The
neuron doctrine does not preclude other levels of explanation in
terms of groups of cells or macroscopic brain domains, but holds
that these can be broken down, without residue, to an account of
individual cell interactions.
Some have suggested that the neuron doctrine should be
replaced by a description of brain function at a ‘global’ level
(Gold and Stoljar, 1999). However, since the causal biophysical
pathways of the neuron doctrine are not seriously in doubt it is
unclear that a global description can be an alternative, rather than
just a higher-level analysis grounded in the same local dynamics.
There may be a temptation to suggest that some of the perplexing
aspects of mental representation can only be accounted for using
approaches such as systems theory or non-linear dynamics that
might be seen to give an ‘emergent’ dynamic ‘greater than the
sum of the parts.’ However, without clear evidence it seems safer
to assume that, as Barlow (1994) says, all causal relations pass
through the bottlenecks of individual neurons.
The second premise is as fundamental but less often
articulated. It underlies Rosenberg’s (2004) concept of receptivity
and Millikan’s idea of ‘consumer’ and is laid out in explicit
neurological terms by Orpwood (2007). The representations we
call percepts must be based on the co-availability of certain signals
to some neuron-based domain, i.e., they must be inputs to such
a domain, which will also generate outputs in response that
allow the percept to be ‘reported.’ (Reporting may be a complex
indirect process but the basic point is unaffected.) Something
has to receive the signals that encode a percept, whether these
are derived originally from sense organs or other sources as in
dreams. An un-received signal does not even qualify as a signal,
since reception is entailed in the concept.
This might seem self-evident. However, this second premise
is worth emphasizing because literature on consciousness often
appears to take a different view. Representations may be seen
as associated with computational or ‘information processing’
operations, which involve not inputs but input–output relations,
or ‘roles in the world’ – the essence of ‘functionalism’ (Fodor,
1975; Block, 1996). The ‘content’ of the representation is then
seen as being dependent not only on the effect of the world on
the computational unit but also on the effect of the unit on the
world. This appears to imply that if percepts belong to physical
domains then those domains are in some way acquainted with, or
informed by, their outputs (effects on the world) as well as their
inputs. This is self-contradictory for any computational system
that obeys standard concepts of causality – what something has
access to is its input – and neuroscience consistently indicates that
these concepts of causality hold good.
I must emphasize that this is a low-level analysis dealing with
individual neuro-computational steps. Events within feedback
systems taken as whole, as in anticipatory models of perception
(Hommel, 2009) can, in a broader sense, be considered as
representing a certain action/perception scenario but even here
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it is not the input/output relation that gives the content, but
the particular pattern of signals (‘the data’), considered either as
cellular outputs or inputs.
Both in neuroscience and philosophy, representations are
often considered in terms of patterns of cell activity, with no
specific reference to input or output. The problem here is that
to consider a pattern as an operant representation implies that
the total activity pattern is accessible to something. A pattern of
activity of 73,456 out of a bank of 1,000,000 right occipital cells
might seem to represent a scene. However, each of these cells may
have 10,000 branches to its axonal output, some feeding forward,
some back. Only 6,228 cells may send branches to each of a bank
of temporal cells, and 18,992 to a bank of prefrontal cells (through
any one direct or indirect route) and, moreover, there will be
variation (and plasticity) in this between individual sending and
receiving cells in each bank. Although the activity of the 73,456
cells is a representation in a certain legitimate vernacular sense,
there seems to be another important sense in which it underpins,
together with whatever other ‘null cells’ whose non-firing may
contribute critically to the content being conveyed, not one, but
many, representations-as-inputs, diverse in content and function.
In other words, an act of representation must ultimately imply
an input to something specified. It is sometimes implied that there
are no ‘inner receiving entities’ for representations in a brain, but,
again, this is inconsistent with our understanding of causality. To
be part of a causal chain, and thus reportable, the information
encoded in a representation must be made available to something
that generates a response. A word of text in a forgotten language
embedded in an opaque medium that cannot be removed without
destroying the text cannot function as a representation. Similarly,
a pattern of lines of cellular activity in my visual cortex that bears
a homotopic relation to a pattern of tree trunks I am viewing
is not acting as a spatial representation by dint of homotopy,
since no part of me, including the cells themselves, is informed
of the spatial relations of active and inactive cells. The cells
provide a representation in the form of presenting sensory data to
other parts of my brain through patterns of downstream synaptic
transmission, but the homotopic spatial relation of their cell
bodies is itself of no consequence. Representation must be linked
to a causal path.
Inner receiving entities are often rejected as ‘homuncular’
and criticized on grounds that shifting the problem of the
input/percept relationship for a brain to a subdomain of brain
leaves the problem unchanged and therefore invokes infinite
regress. The implication of regress is, however, non sequitur. If
the problem is the same as for the whole brain then that must
surely also suffer from the regress. The reverse conclusion applies:
if the problem has any solution for the brain it may also have
a solution for a homuncular subdomain and it may only have a
solution there (see also Fodor, 1975, p. 189) Thus, even Dennett’s
(1988) homunculi that ‘repeat entirely the talents they are rung
in to explain’ are only straw bogeymen. Homunculi are in fact
usefully rung in to deal with practical computational issues.
There is no doubt that treating representations as inputs to
specific neural structures raises difficulties. However, nothing in
neuroscience so far conflicts with the idea that a representation-
as-percept is an input to something. It might be argued that
standard causal principles only apply at the periphery of the
system and not centrally, but it is unclear why or how. We
have no reason to postulate an invisible envelope that divides
an external or peripheral world from an inner ‘animate’ world
(perhaps Fodor’s organism) with novel (i.e., supernatural) non-
local properties, at any structural level. Neurobiology has shown
that we can push the concept of ‘input’ as far in as interpretable
empirical observation will allow, and well within the confines of
the human body or brain. Pressure from an intervertebral disk on
a lumbar nerve root gives pain in the foot. Cochlear implants give
deaf people an experience of sound. Stimulation of cerebral cortex
in the awake individual can evoke sensations and memories. The
evidence indicates that sensory pathways, at all points up to that
where a percept is experienced, are simply providing an input to
the next stage, which often can be mimicked artefactually.
The work of Hubel and Wiesel (2005) and others has
shown that detailed mechanisms of acquisition and collation
of sensory data can be tracked far into the brain. Cells that
respond to lines at particular angles, lines of limited length,
or color contrasts can be demonstrated. It might be argued
that the absence of precise analysis beyond this level could
indicate that signals enter a ‘black box’ in which percepts are
no longer associated with inputs, but rather with input-output
relations. However, the simpler explanation is that beyond this
level computation is so sophisticated that analysis requires very
sophisticated experimental approaches. The more recent work of
Quian Quiroga et al. (2005) showing that individual cortical cells
respond to specific faces suggests that this is so.
In summary, despite speculations in other directions in some
fields of study, the two assumptions of the neuron doctrine and
the doctrine of percepts as based on inputs to perceiving entities
appear to be worth retaining.
POSSIBLE DOMAINS FOR
REPRESENTATIONS AS PERCEPTS
Armed with this basic causal standpoint, it is possible to ask
general questions about the location of the representations as
percepts and the nature of the entities to which these are available.
The starting premise is that at least one domain exists in a
waking brain that supports an experience correlated with input
from sense organs, contextualized by anticipations derived from
kinesthetic monitoring, etc. We want to describe such a domain
in dynamic physical terms. The prima facie case is that it will be a
dynamic domain comprising part or all of one or more neurons,
receiving inputs derived from all sensory modalities, and other
internally generated signals, like names and concepts retrieved
from memory (i.e., anything and everything we can experience),
and capable of sending a sequence of outputs that can connect
to all, or most, motor pathways. Conventional neuroscience
indicates that the input will be of signals leading to patterns
of depolarization of cell membrane. Since we are considering
input this ought to be a pattern within dendrites (i.e., input
projections).
It might be questioned that any single domain has inputs
of all perceptual modalities and also concepts. However, our
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ability to mix raw sensory data and concepts in use of language
indicates that somewhere in the brain signals with these
disparate types of meaning are integrated – i.e., are co-inputs
to some computational unit. Moreover, introspection indicates
that human perceiving subjects experience them concurrently in
a meaningful relationship and do so alongside the use of relevant
language. Synchronization of signals may be important for
optimal computation but as von der Malsburg (1981) pointed out
when first suggesting that synchrony of signals was important, it
can only be important because it determines synchronized arrival
at some site of input.
I agree with Orpwood’s (2007) reasoning that percepts must be
based on inputs that somehow are ‘interpreted’ on arrival at the
perceiving domain and thereby have meaning to the perceiving
subject. As this meaning belongs to the input itself, rather than
any computational input–output relation, it seems that it too
should be located at the site of input in dendrites. ‘Interpretation’
is not meant here in the sense that sensory signals encoding four
legs, a bushy tail, pointed ears, and a toothy snout are converted to
a signal meaning fox. That would imply at least one computation
involving an input–output relation. The identification label ‘fox’
would be the input to the next domain along. Interpretation is
used here to mean simply the correspondence of an input, (of
electrical or chemical signals based on collation amongst sensory
data and with data from memory) to a ‘percept’ that ‘is like
something’ for, or has a meaning to, the receiving entity (in
the above case legs, tail, ears, and snout). ‘Manifestation’ might
be an alternative term, since it implies no additional physical
interaction, but simply a correspondence between physical input
and its meaning to the receiving entity.
Absence of a mechanism for this sense of interpretation
may seem puzzling. However, immediate local correspondence
between physical dynamics and meaningful experience seems
to be something that, like Descartes, we have to take as brute
fact. Ascribing it to processes prior to the point of input to the
perceiving entity makes things no easier. There is no means
by which to carry interpretation forward from previous events,
since we have no evidence for anything other than the physical
input itself being available to the receiving unit. Moreover, the
idea of ‘carrying meaning forward’ generates an absurdity. Since
the history of past events contributing to any causal interaction
is immeasurably complex an immeasurably large number of
‘interpretations’ from earlier events should be carried forward
in causal chains and that is not what we experience. Both the
existence and the richness of the meanings inputs have to human
perceiving subjects may be things for us to wonder at, but trying
to delegate richness elsewhere is no solution.
It seems that representations as meaningful percepts ought to
occur in neural dendrites.
REPRESENTATIONAL DOMAINS
CANNOT BE BASED ON TRAFFIC
A further consideration is helpful in narrowing down options
for the domain of a percept. The content of a percept almost
certainly has to be an interpretation of both signals associated
with membrane excitation and ‘null signals’ corresponding to
where membrane might have been excited but was not. Unless
signals are interpreted in the context of all possible signals in
a domain we lose what appears to be essential for a complex
percept: encoding of information in patterns of inter-relation.
A summation of all and only the black spots of a set of printed
words can have only one meaning: black. (Or if black is coded
null the sum of white areas just means white.) Moreover, it is
indeterminate whether the spots included are on one page, or
in a whole library. Only if both active and null signals and their
relations are included do we have diverse meaning and bounded
domains of meaning. In visual cortex, a ‘line’ of uniform color
within a block of the same color is not interpreted as a line. The
interpretation of ‘a line’ implies the absence of signals encoding
similar color on either side of the line.
This means that the domain that supports a representation
with meaning cannot be defined by a pattern of active signal
traffic; it cannot be defined in terms of where signals are
occurring. It must include null signals, so there must be some
intrinsically defined structural domain within which signals and
null signals are co-interpreted. The domain receiving signals
interpreted as a percept cannot be an ‘active circuit’ in the sense
of a set of pathways currently carrying signal traffic.
There is a distinction here between the processing units in
a brain and in a computer. In a computer there are ‘gates’ in
which electrical signals ‘open’ or ‘close’ connections between
units, forming and breaking electrical circuits. The brain does not
have gates in this sense. Connections remain unchanged, at least
over periods of hours, regardless of traffic. The processing units
are integrators, but not gates. Something akin to gating will occur
during refractory periods and if input signals show differential
synchronization in relation to refractory periods there may be
triage, so that some active signals are ‘let through’ and others
not. However, these signals will still operate in the context of null
signals within the non-refractory time window.
LOCALIZED VERSUS DISTRIBUTED
REPRESENTATIONS
Representations-as-percepts, if only in a degraded form, survive
damage to large areas of cerebral cortex. Damage to certain areas
produces predictable defects, but does not appear to remove the
capacity for some sort of perceptual experience, even if there
is agnosia in the sense of not being aware that the percept is
defective. The inference is that if the type of domain receiving
representations as percepts is indeed cortical then there is no
single and local domain. That leaves options of one very extended
domain or multiple local domains.
The idea that a percept is an interpretation of the inputs to
cells over a wide area of brain generates a range of problems,
quite apart from the basic problem noted by James (1890/1983)
that each cell’s input is separate. Many neurons are involved in
‘housekeeping,’ such as suppression of vision during saccades,
or motor co-ordination. The inputs to such cells do not appear
to figure in percepts, which reflect the input to a select cell
population involved in a field of attention. It is unclear, in a
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distributed model, why the inputs to certain cells and not others
should figure in a reportable percept. Nor is it clear why we
should perceive a single ‘copy’ of sensory data if cells over a wide
area contribute, since most if not all signals arising from cellular
activity in sensory pathways are sent as inputs to many cells
through widely ramifying axonal branches. When we see a red
tomato early signals referring to a red tomato are sent to 1000s of
cells further forward in the brain. Why should we consider these
thousands of ‘copies’ a single representation? If a company sends
out 1000 Christmas cards, each with a photo of head office in the
snow, do we consider this ‘one representation’ of head office?
These and related concerns may have motivated the proposal
by Pribram (1991) that the cortex carries information somewhat
in the manner of a hologram, in which every part of a spatial
array carries a copy of the entire pattern of information being
handled. Although often thought of as a model of distributed
representation, the holographic model provides a means for
having very many ‘copies’ of a pattern at many sites rather
than a single copy available to one extended site. A simpler
and neurologically reasonable version of the idea is just that
sensory data are sent to many locations in the cortex and each
of these has the potential to interpret its input as percept.
This would seem to be in keeping with the experiments of
Quian Quiroga et al. (2005) in which visual sense data often
gave rise to excitation in many sampled cortical cells. In some
cases cells were highly restricted in their responses to images,
but others are more promiscuous. At least there is little doubt
that sensory stimuli lead to signals being sent widely to many
cells.
In summary, although the discussion so far might suggest that
the question of what domain supports a perceptual representation
is just what it must always have been – which cell or cells – it may
need a subtler formulation. How many of which sort of neuron
have a perceptual representation encoded in their input(s) and
do they constitute one domain of one representation of this type
at any one time or are there multiple domains, with multiple
representations based on the same sensory data? It is important
to note that the latter should not be expected to evoke a sense
of multiplicity (of the perception of being one of many subjects)
since multiplicity would not itself be encoded, represented or,
therefore, perceived by anything, being a fact about parallel
reception events, not a property of the receiving unit, or the
content of its input.
At this point the reader may sense that the concept of
representation is too confusing to be useful, and there is a case
for that position! I would argue, however, that if some historic
confusions in the literature are unpacked it is possible to restore
the usefulness of the idea, with some riders that add significant
explanatory power.
PONTIFICAL, GRANDMOTHER AND
CARDINAL CELLS
The simplest hypothesis for the domain of a percept, now
universally taken as a null hypothesis, is that of a single pontifical
cell, as discussed by James (1890/1983) and dating back at least
to ideas raised by Leibniz (Woolhouse and Franks, 1998), writing
shortly after cells were first observed. This form of pontifical cell
is a single cell that supports all ‘my’ representational percepts of
all sensory inputs. It is the ‘me’ cell. Other cells act as conduits
to and from this central cell, collating inputs and delegating
outputs. James considers that they might also support ‘percepts,’
but of a meaner sort than those I report as ‘mine.’ (He includes
the point that none of these percepts need involve any sense of
multiplicity or presence of others.) The attraction of this idea is
that the cell is the brain’s integrating unit, with an intrinsically
delimited input domain, and the contents of human experience
appear to be integrated and delimited. However, the idea that just
one neuron should have this specialized function is implausible
on a range of grounds and, as indicated above, the argument that
experience seems ‘single’ is immaterial, since there would be no
reason for there to be representation (and thus perception) of
multiplicity, or a sense of ‘other copies,’ within each of multiple
representations.
It is useful to raise here a potential confusion in terminology
between sites of representation and sites of recognition.
Sherrington (1940) invoked a concept of a quite different sort
of ’pontifical’ cell to explain recognition. Sensory data relating
to an object such as a dog enters through many 1000s of
receptors. Recognition would appear to require sequential stages
of discrimination, each leading to a reduced number of possible
interpretations. This might be expected to form of a ‘pyramid’
with fewer cells at each stage until the input finally converged
on one cell responsible of recognizing dogs. There would be
a pontifical cell for a dog, another for a cat and another for
grandmother.
A key point here is that we have no reason to think that only
the cell with the job of recognizing dogs will receive input signals
encoding doggy features. If 100 cells each recognized a different
mammal we would not expect the presence of a dog to lead to
input to only one of these. We would expect all the cells to receive
signals encoding doggy features but only one (or some) to fire.
It could be argued that synapses receiving signals encoding long
snouts will atrophy on koala-recognizing cells but at least to be
able to learn to recognize new animals we have to assume that
cells with catholic inputs exist.
Thus if a representation is based on an input pattern we
do not expect sites of representation and recognition to be
commensurate. This emphasizes the need to consider a causal
chain as potentially involving many levels of representation with
multiplicity at each level (Figure 1). It highlights the fact that a
representation is always a step in a causal chain and is thus always
a representation to a domain at a particular point in that chain.
Thus a pattern of data, perhaps encoding legs, fur and muzzle,
would represent a dog to a ‘dog-pontifical cell’ as well as to a lot of
other cells, untuned, or tuned to other creatures. In turn the firing
of the dog-pontifical cell and not its neighbors would denote ‘dog’
to the rest of the brain. The two types of representation would be
quite different. Moreover, intuition tells us that whatever domain
has a percept of a dog of the sort normally discussed it must have
an input encoding both the key features of a dog – legs, fur, etc. –
and the sense of these being part of a dog, apparently putting
the relevant domain downstream of the site of dog-recognition
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FIGURE 1 | Simplified schema of successive representations-as-origin and representations-as-input, starting with sensory patterns, followed by
recognition with encoding as identifiers that allow recall from memory of concepts and finally the generation of percepts including both sensory
patterns and conceptual/naming features.
with additional parallel input encoding the original upstream
context-dependent sensory data.
Empirical studies indicate that recognition does not use a
pyramidal system with fewer and fewer cells at each stage
(Barlow, 1972). Sequential stages involve as many, if not more,
cells as at the beginning – as implied by the above discussion.
Recognition is signaled by the firing of one or a few cells in
the context of non-firing of many more cells. At all stages
representations are thus widespread, but it needs to be established
whether this is because individual representations are extended or
because of multiplicity.
This issue is relevant to Barlow’s (1972) classic Perception
paper. Barlow takes as his object grandmother, following Letvin
(Gross, 2002) and discusses the plausibility of a ‘grandmother cell’
in the sense of a single cell that fires with 100% sensitivity and
specificity for grandmother. This bears a relation to Sherrington’s
(1940) pontifical cell but not to that of Leibniz or James. Barlow
suggested that grandmother was probably not important enough
to have her own cell and that, more likely, grandmother would
be encoded by the activity of perhaps a thousand ‘cardinal’ cells,
each representing an aspect of grandmother such as a mouth
or nose, any of which might presumably contribute to encoding
other faces in other combinations. These elements of the percept
are then seen as combining rather in the way words combine in a
sentence (an analogy also used by Marr, 1982). Note that Barlow is
not proposing a redundancy-for-safety strategy with information
distributed in a ‘holographic’ way to several cells, each with a
sensitivity and specificity of less than 100%. He is giving each cell
a separate and specific job.
The odd thing here is that Barlow appears to be describing the
activity of cells upstream of a site of recognition of grandmother.
If each cell is responding to signals which together encode
a feature not entirely specific and sensitive for grandmother
then grandmother can only be recognized, and social responses
activated, by a downstream group of cells receiving inputs from
these thousand cells, some of which downstream cells will fire and
some not. It would be these downstream cells whose inputs would
encode all grandmother’s features and it would therefore be their
domains that we could (perhaps) expect to support a ‘percept’
of granny in the sense of manifestation of all of grandmother’s
features, whether or not they fired. And it would be the pattern of
firing and non-firing of these latter cells that would ‘represent’
(in the denoting sense) to domains in the rest of the brain
the presence, but not the pattern of features, of this individual.
Whether or not within this latter group of cells there are cells with
100% sensitivity and specificity for grandmother is a different
issue that need not bear on the search for the domains supporting
the representations known as percepts.
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More recently, Quian Quiroga and Kreiman (2010), has
discussed the interpretation of experiments on individual cell
responses to faces (Quian Quiroga et al., 2005) in relation to
the grandmother cell concept. In this case the grandmother
cell is rejected on redundancy grounds. While emphasizing the
complexity of the grandmother cell concept, discussion seems
to bypass the crucial issue of the distinction between the site of
experience of a pattern such as a face and the site of recognition
of such a pattern. Nevertheless, it seems to support the idea
that inputs carrying information about a pattern such as a face
will be received by not one, but many cellular computational
units.
The above discussion emphasizes a number of issues relating
to this crucial question. It seems that representations (in the
broadest sense) of a given referent in the brain must be multiple
and diverse. At each level many cells will be involved in
representing. Representation and recognition are not likely to
be commensurate. So far the discussion has been in terms of
individual cells despite the general assumption in the literature
that representations in brains each involve many cells. The
grounds for such an assumption need be revisited in the light of
the preceding arguments.
A RETURN TO THE NEURON DOCTRINE
As already noted, to be useful, the concept of representation-
as-percept, has to imply a step in a causal chain with content
encoded in the input to some domain. It is also difficult to see
how a representation can have a meaning, or interpretation,
to a domain, unless its content is encoded in the co-temporal
input of a pattern of active signals and null signals to the
domain. Representations like this do not occur in computers.
Stored data in a computer can represent something meaningful
to a human user accessing it via a screen but no representation
based on a pattern of co-temporal input occurs to anything
within the machine beyond the four trivial input options
for an electronic gate of on/on, on/off, off/on and off/off.
Moreover, we do not require that anything in a computer
interprets, or attributes meaning to, input signals. It might
be argued that a sequence of signals passing through a gate
might constitute a representation. However, since each signal
contributes to a separate computation this is problematic. The
sequence of incoming signals is not subjected as a whole
to a computation, other than as arbitrarily defined by a
programmer. Within the machine any temporal ‘chunking’ of
serial signals into ‘representations’ adds nothing to the causal
account and at the gate in question no chunking should be
apparent.
Within brains there are units that receive complex patterns
co-temporally: neurons. Moreover, they are the only units that
receive patterns relevant to percepts as far as we know. Barlow’s
1000 cardinal cells are not a unit receiving a pattern of features of
grandmother. Each has a separate input encoding one feature. For
all 1000 features to contribute co-temporally to a representation
1000 cardinal cells must send all 1000 active or null signals to
converge on at least one downstream neuron, which is within
the range of neuronal inputs. The neuron doctrine, as was
probably evident to Leibniz, entails the simple but surprising
conclusion that representations qua percepts in brains can only
be in individual neurons (Edwards, 2005; Sevush, 2006, 2016).
There may be very large numbers of such representations, all
encoding the same sensory data, distributed over a wide area,
but each percept must be tied to the receiving unit that is the
neuron.
This conclusion immediately resolves the paradox of
localization and distribution of representation in the brain, since
it implies that local representations can be present over a widely
distributed area. This situation is familiar in the distribution of
a newspaper, which is widespread but can only convey news if
all the words of a news story are present in each copy read by
an individual. To suggest that a single perceptual representation
could be available to several cells is equivalent to saying that news
can be understood by a group of people each of which receives
one word from the paper.
The conclusion also resolves the question of precisely where
in the brain are the representations that determine our actions.
The answer is that they may be all over the brain. Even
the question of where in the brain are the representations
that determine considered verbalized behavior may have the
same answer, although it seems reasonable to attach some
special significance to representations in cells with multimodal
inputs that would allow both the visual and auditory features
and the concept of a dog to contribute to a ‘percept’ of
a dog.
Putting representations in individual cells may appear
implausible. However, it is unclear why a representation in a
single cell should be more implausible than one involving many
cells. The implausibility may be more salient simply because
any proposal for a specific location for such representations
brings into focus our lack of understanding of the rules of
interpretation. This may be no bad thing. Ironically, the charge of
implausibility tends to come from those who argue for functional
rather than structural analysis and yet the conclusion is based
on the ‘functional’ property of having input (and capacity)
rather than structure. The conclusion might be branded over-
reductive but one of its key features is that it makes explicit
the boundary between reductive analysis and the non-reductive
relation of ‘interpretation,’ rather than invoking an ill-defined
internal no-man’s-land where both are claimed to apply at
different ‘levels.’
Another attraction of the idea that representations are to
the single computational (rule based input–output) units that
are neurons is that it implies that the brain does not perform
single operations on ‘atomic’ (structureless) symbols, but rather
it performs operations on ‘molecular’ representations. That is
to say that the basic data units that the brain operates on are
irreducibly complex, with many degrees of freedom. This begins
to address the puzzle of how the manipulation of symbols can
be associated with an experience of complex patterns that reflect
the complexity of their referents. It also provides a reason why,
as appears to be increasingly recognized, syntax and semantics
cannot be totally dissociated when considering meaning (Hinzen,
2006).
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MULTIPLE REPRESENTATIONS OF
MULTIPLE TYPES
The concept of multiplicity of representations of sensory data
in the brain should not be unexpected if we consider the
parallel and hierarchical nature of computation. There may
be a lingering presumption that representations, qua percepts,
ought to be single – belonging to a single ‘me,’ but this is
not logically required. There is also a lingering discomfort with
the idea that our actions may be guided by representations
distinct from those we report as our percepts. Perhaps the best
known ‘redundancy’ of representations is that implied by the
dual path hypothesis for visual perception of Goodale and Milner
(1992). The dissociation of percept and action described by
Króliczak et al. (2006) for the hollow face illusion, presents the
counterintuitive idea that the brain builds more than one spatial
representation, which might seem redundant or extravagant in
use of resources. This has the interesting implication that we
consider the building of spatial representations qua percepts
labor-intensive.
Figure 1 illustrates an approach to representation in the
brain that suggests that this concern may be misplaced. It
makes explicit the idea that ‘representation’ has two different
meanings. One sense of representation (R) is an instance of
a pattern, as in a picture or map, that acts as origin for a
representation in the other sense (r) of an instance of representing
to something via its input. At every stage of neural computation
we can expect a representation-as-input to lead to an output
that can act as representation-as-origin for the next stage. At
every stage banks of cells will be involved but whereas such a
bank of cells will hold a single representation-as-origin it will
hold as many representations-as-inputs as there are cells in the
bank. Perhaps surprisingly, although building a representation-
as-origin is likely to be labor-intensive, much larger numbers of
representations-as-inputs, which we could expect to correspond
to percepts, would appear to come free of charge.
We are used to the idea that the nervous system generates
motor output from sensory input at several levels of complexity.
There are spinal reflexes, brainstem reflexes, automatic but co-
ordinated responses involving cerebellum, routine purposive
actions and deliberated actions. All of these can be expected
to be associated with different levels of representation-as-
origin and representations-as-input so we should not be
surprised by the idea of multiple spatial representations
even in terms of representations-as-origin. Perhaps more
interestingly, as indicated on the right side of Figure 1,
hierarchies of representation-as-origin give the opportunity for
representations-as-input downstream to ‘pick-‘n’-mix’ inputs
from more than one level of this hierarchy. Thus there is nothing
very surprising about the idea that the representations that guide
our rapid actions appear to overlap in content in most but not all
situations with those that form the basis of our percepts.
CONCLUSION
Mainstream neuroscience prides itself in being rigorously
physicalist, in the sense of adhering to the basic precepts
of natural science and general principles of causality.
A consideration of representations in such a rigorous causal
framework leads to the conclusion that all representations in
the brain, including those that may form the basis of percepts,
must ultimately be considered in terms of how they are cashed
out in the inputs to individual neurons. These representations as
inputs will occur at multiple levels of sensory processing and will
be multiple at all levels, including levels associated with pattern
recognition, denotation and reportable percepts. Such a model is
counterintuitive but resolves certain important problems relating
to the distributed nature of representation and may provide clues
to the basis of meaning and language.
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